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ABSTRACT
Recently, the application of deep learning in steganalysis has
drawn many researchers’ attention. Most of the proposed
steganalytic deep learning models are derived from neural
networks applied in computer vision. These kinds of neu-
ral networks have distinguished performance. However, all
these kinds of back-propagation based neural networks may
be cheated by forging input named the adversarial example.
In this paper we propose a method to generate steganographic
adversarial example in order to enhance the steganographic
security of existing algorithms. These adversarial examples
can increase the detection error of steganalytic CNN. The ex-
periments prove the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms— steganography, steganalysis, deep learn-
ing, adversarial example
1. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the science and the art of covert commu-
nication via digital media. Accompanied by steganography,
steganalysis is the methodology to detect the trace of secret
message in the media. As the steganographic algorithms em-
bed the message in the media via slightly modifying the image
elements, steganalysis applies statistical methods to catch the
trace of these kinds of modifications. To decrease the possi-
bility of being detected by steganalyzer, the modern steganog-
raphy focus on adaptive schemes.
Adaptive steganography is the scheme that embeds the
message according to the content of media. The scheme mod-
ifies the elements in complicated area of the image, so the
modifications can be concealed by the local content. To de-
tect adaptive steganography effectively, steganalytic method
equipped with Rich Model [1] is invented. Rich Model is the
steganalytic feature extraction scheme which can capture the
high order statistical feature of the stego image.
Recently, researchers start to apply deep learning for ste-
ganalysis. These years have seen a great progress on it. The
first work was proposed in [2]. Although the performance is
not outstanding, it is an early attempt. Later, the work that
can nearly challenge the Rich Model was proposed in [3]. In
2015, Xu et al. proposed a neural network [4] whose perfor-
mance is better than Rich Model. With these beneficial ex-
ploration, deep learning based steganalysis has become one
of the mainstream of research [5]. Comparing with handy-
crafted-designed steganalysis, the advantage of deep learning
based steganalysis is its ”end-to-end” framework. Despite the
structure of the network and super parameters for training is
needed to be manually determined, the parameters of the neu-
ral network is optimized by machine during training.
With development of deep learning, researchers found
that the neural network which relies on back-propagation
(BP) has an interesting property [6][7]. Such property is that
the BP-based neural network may mis-classify the input data
when the data is added a ”noise” map generated from gra-
dient feature map of the neural network. This kind of data
for ”cheating” the BP-based neural network is named as the
adversarial example.
In this paper we propose a novel method to enhance the
security of the existing adaptive steganographic algorithms
against the deep-learning-based steganalysis. Given a opti-
mized steganalytic CNN model, we can generate the adver-
sarial examples of the input images. The adversarial exam-
ple can ”cheat” the steganalytic CNN (Convolutional Neu-
ral Network), so as to decrease the possibility of being de-
tected. The proposed method exploits the gradient feature
map to determine the flipping direction of pixels while em-
bedding, the flipping is equivalent to ±1. This operation per-
turbs the classification of steganalyzer and makes the clas-
sification result lean to cover. The experiments show that the
steganographic adversarial example can significantly increase
the detection error rate of the steganalyzer. We note that the
proposed method is a forging method to protect the stego im-
age from being detected, which is different from recently pre-
vailing Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). GAN based
method is to generate stego image [8] or distortion function
[9], which needs to train a new generative neural networks.
The proposed method in this paper does not build new neural
network, instead, it generates adversarial data from stegana-
lyzer but does not update the parameters of the steganalyzer.
Our goal is to enhance the security of existing steganographic
algorithms.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. notations
A digital image can be represented in either a matrix or a vec-
tor. Matrix is noted with capital boldface X, its element in
t(i, j) is noted as Xij . Vector is noted with lower case bold-
face v, the element in the i-th dimension is noted as vi.
In this paper, we focus on the spatial gray-scale image.
Therefore, a pixel xi ∈ {0, ..., 255}. The steganographic dis-
tortion of pixel xi is noted as ρi and ρi > 0, ρi ∈ R.
2.2. DM framework
The adaptive steganographic framework has become the fun-
damental infrastructure in recent years. The framework can
be also abbreviated to DM (distortion-minimization) frame-
work [10][11][12][13]. The DM framework consists of dis-
tortion function and adaptive coding method.
2.2.1. distortion function
Given a image, steganographer slightly changes some pixels
to embed the secret message in the image. Due to the modi-
fication, the statistical perturbation is introduced into the im-
age inevitably. The steganalytic schemes are designed to de-
tect this kind of perturbation so as to distinguish the normal
image and the stego image. The target of DM framework is
to minimize the statistical perturbation of the steganographic
modification. However, it is difficult to model the statistical
effect of stego embedding because of the data’s high dimen-
sion and correlation of pixels. To quantify the effect of the
modification, the steganographic distortion function is pro-
posed. The distortion function is defined as the metric of sta-
tistical perturbation caused by steganographic modification.
To be a practical solution of DM framework, it is considered
to be additive. The cost value of a pixel is heuristically cal-
culated based on neighbors. From distortion function, every
pixel is assigned a profile as the cost of being changed. The
profile in the complex region is lower than that in the smooth
region. Intuitively, such property of distortion function makes
the modifications gathering in the complex regions.
2.2.2. adaptive coding method
As cost values are assigned to the pixels, next target is to em-
bed the secret message in the image while minimizing the sum
of cost values. The state-of-the-art coding method is called
STC [14] (Syndrome-Trellis Code). Next, we will briefly in-
troduce STC.
We note that x ∈ {0, 1}n is the LSB vector of the cover
pixels and y ∈ {0, 1}n is the LSB vector of the cover pixels,
m ∈ {0, 1}l is the secret message sequence to be embed, H ∈
{0, 1}l×n is a binary matrix. The steganographic embedding
task is modifying x to y. The modification pattern s, which
s = x− y. The task is an optimizing problem:
argmin
n∑
i=1
ρi · si
s.t.H× y = m,
(1)
where ρi is i-th pixel’s cost value and si is i-th element of
modification pattern s. STC is derived from Viterbi algorithm
and it can solve the problem (1) near-optimally.
In this paper we apply single-layered STC as the embed-
ding method. Single-layered STC is often applied for LSBR
(LSB replacement) embedding, which is changing the LSB
of selected pixel. Besides LSBR, there are several methods to
change the LSB. In this paper, we use±1 to flip LSB and use
single-layered STC to determine the pixels to be changed.
3. STEGANOGRAPHIC ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE
3.1. adversarial example
In 2014, Szegedy et al. found an intriguing property of neural
networks that the BP-based neural network will mis-classify
the image when the input data is added a well-designed noise
map derived from back-propagated gradient residual [6]. The
perturbation is invisible but is sensitive to the neural network.
Such kinds of input data that can cause mis-classification is
called the adversarial example.
Although neural networks have many variations of ar-
chitectures, all of them is the mapping operation. In the
task of steganalysis, the mapping function is denoted as
F : R512×512 → {[1, 0], [0, 1]}. The input of neural network
is a image and the output is a label vector [cover, stego].
The output result is determined by the probabilities of 2
categories. We note the probability of cover image as pc
and probability of stego image as ps. pc and ps satisfy the
relation:
pc = 1− ps (2)
To make further explanation, let pc = Fc(X). For a
trained model, Fc is differentiable almost everywhere. Given
an image X, we can compute the gradient matrix of Fc. The
gradient matrix of Fc is denoted as G:
G = ∇Fc(X) =


∂Fc(X)
∂X1,1
· · · ∂Fc(X)
∂X1,n
...
∂Fc(X)
∂Xi,j
...
∂Fc(X)
∂Xm,1
· · · ∂Fc(X)
∂Xm,n

 (3)
the element in (i, j) is the gradient value of the pixel Xij .
When Gij > 0, within the local neighborhood ofXij , Fc(X)
is increasing. On the contrary, Fc(X) decreases within the
local neighborhood whenGij < 0.
From equation (2) we know:
∇pc = −∇ps, (4)
which indicates that these two probabilities shift in oppo-
site directions. To a steganographer, he can use the back-
propagated gradient feature map to control the classification
result, in order to cheat the steganalyzer.
3.2. fast gradient sign method
In 2015, Goodfellow et al. proposed a method to generate
the adversarial example, which is called Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [7]. The method is simple to implement and
has a remarkable effect on cheating the deep learning model.
To empathize the variables of the function, the mapping
function of the model is denoted as Fc(x, θ). In the function,
x is the input data, θ is the parameters of the model.
To generate a adversarial example, the easiest solution
is adding the CNN’s gradient feature map to the input data.
However, for a optimized model, the back-propagated signal
is too weak to have a significant effect. As the sign of the gra-
dient value (±) indicates the changing trend of the function,
we apply the signum function (y = sgn(x)) to the gradient
value instead of its original value. The perturbation η is com-
puted as follows:
η = ǫ · sgn(∇xFc(x, θ)) (5)
where ǫ is the magnitude of the perturbation signal. In the-
oretical analysis, ǫ ∈ R+. However, in application scenario,
the CNN’s input data is usually 8-bit integer, so we set ǫ = 1.
After generating perturbing feature map, we can add it to
the original input data:
x˜ = x + η, (6)
x˜ is the adversarial example of x. In [7], the authors choose
GoogLeNet [15] to test the method. The adversarial exam-
ple is mis-classified by the model and has a very high confi-
dence (99.3%). Therefore, FGSM is proved to be an effective
method. In this paper, we generate η of the cover image and
add it to the stego image. The details will be discussed in the
next section.
3.3. steganographic adversarial example
Inspired by [6][7], we proposed a method to enhance the se-
curity of DM steganographic algorithms against deep learning
based steganalysis.
In our method, we apply single-layered STC to embed
the message. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, we use single-
layered STC to determine the pixels to be changed. Despite
a small number of wet pixels (0 or 255), both +1 and -1 are
suitable for changing the LSB. Therefore, we can determine
the flipping direction of the pixel to be modified according to
the sign of its gradient residual.
Our task is to cheat the steganalytic neural network. The
first step is generating the gradient feature map of the cover.
Given a steganalytic CNN model and a cover image, we first
input the image into CNN, and get the classifying result.
Next, we conduct the back-propagation to get the gradient
feature map of the cover. In the case of that cover is classified
as stego, we force the output label to be cover, in order to
make sure that gradient feature map tends to cover. Step 1
is illustrated in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, the 5 × 5 blank matrix
on the left top represents the cover image. The cover is the
input of the steganalyzer (block in the middle, labelled with
”Steg-CNN”). The output (right) is the classifiction result,
which is a label vector. As the input is cover, so the output
label vector is [1, 0]. Then we conduct back-propagation. The
gradient feature map is on the left bottom. In the gradient
feature map matrix, red grid is +1 and blue gird is -1.
Fig. 1. Generating cover’s gradient feature map
Step 2 is illustrated in Fig. 2, which is determining the
positions to be changed in the cover image. This step is a
typical DM steganographic embedding operation. In this step
we apply single-layered STC (abbreviated to SL-STC in Fig.
2) to determine the pixels to be changed. In the figure, input
is the cover (left) and output (right) is the matrix that implies
the pixels to be changed. The gray-colored grid in the matrix
means that the pixel is to be modified and white grid means
the pixel is unchanged.
Fig. 2. Determining modification positions
Step 3 is generating the adversarial example. In Step 1 we
get the gradient feature map which can make the stego image
look like the cover image. In Step 2 we know the pixels to
be modified. The task of Step 3 is to actually modify the
cover image according to the sign of gradient residual. The
modification of each pixel is either +1 or -1. We note that if
the pixel is a wet pixel, which means that its value is 0 or 255,
its flipping direction is fixed to be +1 or -1, respectively. In
Fig. 3, the output matrix (right) is the adversarial stego image.
Fig. 3. Generating adversarial example
4. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we test the performance of our method.
We choose Xu’s CNN and maxSRM + ensemble classifier
[16][17] as steganalyzers. We apply average detection error
rate P¯E of the steganalyzer to evaluate the performance of the
proposed method. P¯E is calculated as follows:
P¯E =
1
2
(PFA + PMD) (7)
where PFA is the false alarm rate and PMD is the mis-
detection rate.
We use BOSSbase (10000 images) as the image base. We
choose five payload rates to generate stego images, which are
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4. We choose S-UNIWARD and HILL
to generate stego images. Under each payload rate, we ran-
domly choose 5000 images in BOSSbase as cover images and
generate their corresponding stego images via single-layered
STC. Therefore, for each payload rate, there is a training set
with 5000 cover/stego pairs. With a training set, we train a
CNN model and an ensemble classifier. The rest 5000 im-
ages are used to generate testing sets. Firstly, being as the
same as generating training set, we generate 5000 cover/stego
pairs as a testing set under each payload rate. Then, for ev-
ery stego image in the testing set, we generate an adversar-
ial stego image from its corresponding payload rate’s CNN
model via our method, so we have an another testing set with
5000 cover/adversarial pairs. We note that these two testing
sets (5000 cover/stego and 5000 cover/adversarial) are not
used to train the steganalyzers. The original model of Xu’s
CNN uses five identical neural networks. For convenience,
we use one neural network here.
Fig. 4 is the experiment result on Xu’s CNN and Fig.
5 is the result on maxSRM + ensemble classifier. The data
in circle is the result of ”original stegos” (without adversar-
ial examples) and data in triangle is the result of adversar-
ial examples. From the results of two experiments we can
find that the proposed method has good performance both in
CNN based-method and in feature-based method. It is proved
that our method is effective to enhance the security of existing
steganographic algorithms.
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Fig. 4. Results on Xu’s CNN
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Fig. 5. Results on maxSRM
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a novel method to enhance the se-
curity of steganographic algorithm towards the attack of deep
learning based steganalysis. As the BP-based neural network
can be cheated by forging data named adversarial examples,
we apply this forging method in steganography. The experi-
ments prove the effectiveness of our method.
Encouraged by the result of experiments, we will step for-
ward in the future work. In this paper we generate the adver-
sarial examples via single-layered STC in spatial domain. In
the future, we will design the adversarial method applied on
double-layered STC.
Finally, we need to emphasize that the adversarial exam-
ple method applied in this paper can only deceive the stegan-
alyzer trained with non-adversarial example. To enhance the
steganographic security, we need to further explore the adver-
sarial method. This is also a part of our future work.
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